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material. Yet this evidence cannot be used to find the truth of the allegations
of the petition.80
It would seem worthwhile for interested legislative and professional commit-
tees to review the operation and effect of the New York provision which governs
the admission of evidence into the juvenile court. Under the New York law only
competent, legally admissible evidence may be introduced at the fact-finding
heanring.81 Consideration should be given to amending the California law to
provide for a similar limitation82 when a minor is alleged to have committed a
crime and he demes the allegations of the petition.
Donna Spragg*
80 See text at notes 18-24 supra.
81N.Y. F m y CT. Act § 744(a) (McKinney 1963). The importance of due
process at the fact-finding stage was expressed by one writer: "The protection provided
by the procedural standards of the fourteenth amendment pertains pnmarily to the
preliminary decision of whether any disposition is justified." Welch, supra note 76, at 667.
82 Consideration might also be given to the provision of the New York Family
Court Act which deems an uncorroborated out-of-court confession an insufficient basis
for a finding by the court. N.Y. FmmY CT. AcT § 744(b) (McKinney 1963). The
Covemor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice recommended a similar mclu-
sion in the Calfforma law, but the recommendation was not adopted. See 1960 Com.mas-
si N REPORT pt. 1, at 73.
* Member, Second Year Class.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
CONDUCT RULE
Section 1151 of the new California Evidence Code renders evidence of reme-
dial or precautionary measures taken after the occurrence of an event madmis-
sible to prove negligence or culpable conduct m connection with the event.'
According to the code drafters this section "codifies well-settled law."2 Indeed it
does.3 The principle embodied m section 1151 is law m every jurisdiction in the
United States4 except Kansas.5 Furthermore, the specific form of the Califorma
provision duplicates that found in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.6
I CAL. EvmmNcE CODE § 1151 provides: "Subsequent remedial conduct. When, after
the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken
previously, would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such
subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection
with the event."
2 CAL. EvmENC: CODE § 1151, comment.
8 E.g., Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303, 78 Pac. 710 (1904); Sappenfield v. Main
St., & Agricultural Park R.R., 91 Cal. 48, 27 Pao. 509 (1891).
4 See, e.g., Columbia & P.S. R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); Annot., 170
A.L.R. 7, 19 (1947).
5 E.g.,iHoward v. Osage City, 89 Kan. 205, 132 Pae. 187 (1913).
6 UN ORi RuIX oF EvmECE 51.
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There is general agreement that this rule serves a most useful social purpose,
namely that of allowing persons to take remedial steps after an accident without
fear that such precautions may be considered an admission of negligence with
respect to the earlier condition.7 The comment to the code provision constitutes
a reaffirmation of the wisdom of such a policy.8
The rule, however, is not without exception.9 It has been held that in appro-
priate cases where important collateral issues are contested, evidence of repairs
may be introduced to establish (1) control of the premises in question,'0 (2) the
duty of defendant to repair,11 (3) notice of the prior defect;'2 (4) the cause of
the accident,' 3 (5) the condition at the time of the accident,14 and other such
issues.' 5 The ]ustilfcation for allowing the exceptions ennumerated above seems
to lie in the fact that when introduced to clarify collateral points, the relevancy
of such evidence is strong enough to overcome the countervailing effect of the
policy considerations which support the general rule.' 6
Impeachment of Witnesses
Another exception, recognized in California l7 as well as other junsdictions,' 8
deserves more careful attention. Evidence of remedial conduct has been held ad-
missible for the purpose of impeaching the veracity of a witness.19 In many cases
the rationalization for permitting the exception is persuasive. If the defendant
owner has made repairs after an accident it is at least clear that he believed that
the premises or instrumentality could be rendered safer. To allow defendant to
strengthen his case by testimony that the condition was as safe as possible before
the accident without the ability to contradict such evidence with his own actions
would be manifestly unjust.
This same exception, however, has been approved under less compelling cir-
7 McComicx, EVIDENCE § 252 (1954); 2 WxcMopx, EVIDrCE § 283 (3d ed. 1940);
Wrrmsr, CAironu EVIDENCE § 385 (2d ed. 1966).
8 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1151, comment: "The admission of evidence of subsequent
repairs to prove negligence would substantially discourage persons from making repairs
after the occurrence of an accident."
9 WcmoHE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 283; WrrmN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 385.
3o E.g., Dubonowski v. Howard Say. Institution, 124 N.J.L. 368, 12 A.2d 384 (1940);
Scudero v. Campbell, 288 N.Y. 328, 43 N.E.2d 66 (1942).
"1 E.g., Boggs v. Cullowhee Mining Co., 162 N.C. 393, 78 S.E. 274 (1913); Carleton
v. Rockland, T. & C. St. Ry., 110 Me. 397, 86 At. 334 (1913).
12 E.g., Patton v. Sanborn, 133 Iowa 650, 110 N.W 1032 (1907); Hang v. McCutch-
eon, 23 Ohio App. 500, 155 N.E. 701 (1926).
13 E.g., Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 182, 106 Po. 587 (1910).
14E.g., Choctaw, 0. & G. R.R. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64 (1903); Dyas v. Southern
Pac. Co., 140 Cal. 296, 73 Pao. 972 (1903).
15 E.g., McCoImcK, op. cit. supra note 7, § 252 nn. 17 & 18.
16 Falknor, Extnnm Policies Affecting Admisibility, 10 RtrrcEas L. REV. 574, 591
(1956).
17 E.g., Inyo Chem. Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 525, 55 P.2d 850 (1936); Wagner
v. Atchison T. & S.F By., 210 Cal. 526, 292 Pac. 645 (1930).
as E.g., Choctaw, 0. & G. R.R. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64 (1903); Chicago & E. R.R.
v. Barnes, 10 Ind. App. 460, 38 N.E. 428 (1894).
19 E.g., Inyo Chem. Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 525, 55 P.2d 850 (1936).
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cumstances.20 In fact, if section 1151 is simply a codification of prior Califorma
law as the comment states,21 plaintiffs would seem to control a subterfuge by
wich they can circumvent the strictures of the rule and present to the jury all
the prejudicial facts concerning subsequent repairs.
The mechanics of this artifice are disturbingly simple. Realizing that subse-
quent repairs may have been made, the liberal Califorma discovery procedure22
invests plaintiffs counsel with broad powers of investigation. Through depositions
he may learn about any repairs, the circumstances that gave rise to them, the
person who authorized them, and the persons involved in the actual work. Each
may be questioned in detail and there are no restrictions in the scope of such
depositions which will inhibit counsers investigatory activities.23 In fact, the only
limitations placed upon depositions in California are relevancy and privilege, 24
neither of which form a basis for defendant's objection to questions asked about
subsequent precautions.
Once plaintiffs counsel has discovered and compiled all the pertinent data
surrounding the repairs, he may proceed, at trial, to call the defendant or de-
fendant's employee who authorized or ordered repairs to be made as an adverse
witness.25 During examination he asks a simple question: "In your opinion, sir,
were the premises in a safe condition at the time of the accident?" Having re-
ceived the obvious affirmative answer to this question, plaitiff is free to impeach
the veracity of defendant's opinion with evidence of the remedial precautions
that have been taken 2 0
Although the evidence admitted in this manner is sub]ect to a limiting in-
struction that it may not be considered substantively, but only as bearing upon
the veracity of the witness' opinon,27 it is the opinion of this writer that such an
instruction is dubious protection in light of the prejudicial nature of evidence of
repairs. Moreover, the defendant, may be able to nmmize the effect of such
evidence by pointing out to the jury that his duty was only to use ordinary care
under the circumstances; and that in taking subsequent steps to render the con-
dition safer he was exceeding the duty required of him by the law. However,
20 The dissenting opinion in Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 48 Cal. 2d 655,
667-71, 313 P.2d 557, 564-67 (1957), criticized clever cross-exanimation on the part of
attorney Melvin Belli which confused the witness into making the statement which was
subsequently impeached with evidence of remedial conduct.21 CAL. EViNcE CODE § 1151, comment.
22 See, Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961);
see CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. §§ 2016, 2031.
28 CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 2016 provides: "[Tlhe deponent may he examined re-
garding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be mad-
missible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."
24 1bd.
2 5 CAL. EviENcE CODE § 776: "Examination of adverse party or witness. (a) A
party to the record of any civil action, or a person identified with such a party, may be
called and examined as if under cross-examination by any adverse party at any time
during the presentation of evidence by the party calling the witness."26Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957).
27 WrrMN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 316.
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there is a serious question whether defendant should be put to the task of re-
butting the inference drawn from evidence of repairs admitted under the dubious
circumstances outlined above.
The simplicity by which this long established exclusionary rule may be frus-
trated by the impeachment exception has not escaped ]udicial scrutiny. The Cali-
forma courts have examined the problem on several occasions 28 and the present
law exhibits one limitation by which the courts have attempted to preserve the
integrity of the rule. In Pierce v. J. C. Penney Co., 29 the District Court of Appeal
refused to allow evidence of repairs to be used for the impeachment of a non-
expert witness 0 who had not actually authorized such repairs.31 Although the
court recognized the dangers inherent in an extension of the impeachment ex-
ception,3 2 Judge Herndon, writing for the majority, still approved the earlier
decision of Daggett v. Atchwon, T & S.F Ry.,3 3 affirming, albeit by dictum,
that in the case of an expert witness, impeachment is possible without proof that
he had any connection whatever with the prior condition. 4
The Code
California law on the subject crystalized with the Pierce decision. The com-
ment to section 1151 of the Code clearly establishes the legislative intention to
retain both the exception and the rule as previously applied.35 If the Evidence
28 Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957); Hatfield
v. Levy Bros., 18 Cal. 2d 798, 117 P.2d 841 (1941); Pierce v. J. C. Penney Co., 167 Cal.
App. 2d 3, 334 P.2d 117 (1959).
29 167 Cal. 2d 3, 334 P.2d 117 (1959).
80 The California Supreme Court had held n Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S.F Ry.,
48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957) that an expert witness could be impeached without
proof that he had any connection with the subsequent precautions taken.31 
"But, manifestly, the fact that after the accident some unidentified person other
than the witness directed or authorized alterations affords no basis for the utilization of
the method of impeachment now under consideration." Pierce v. J. C. Penny Co., 167 Cal.
App. 2d 3, 8, 334 P.2d 117, 121 (1959).
82 "If the present ruling were to be sustained, then the dearest dictates of logic
would require a holding in the next case that the same impeaching (contradictory) type
of evidence here elicted on cross-examination may properly be elicited from witnesses
called in rebuttal. Such a holding would mean that whenever a defendant in this type
of case calls any witness to testify to any observation tending to prove the safety of, or
the lack of danger or defectiveness, in Is premises at the time of an accident, the door
is automatically opened to plaintiff to prove (by way of impeachment) every subsequent
repair made or precaution taken." Id. at 11, 334 P.2d at 122.
as48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957). In this case a signal expert, called by plain-
tiff as an adverse witness, testified that the wigwag signal in place at the time of the
accident was the safest type of automatic warning devise. Plaintiff was allowed to im-
peach the veracity of this opinon by showing that the Public Utilities Commission had
required its removal subsequently, and that a flashing red light had replaced it. Similarly,
the testimony of a railway employee, who had been called as an adverse witness, that the
speed limit on the track was 90 m.p.h. at the time of trial was impeached by evidence
showing that it had been reduced at 50 m.p.h. after the accident.
84 Pierce v. J. C. Penney Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 3, 12, 334 P.2d 117, 123 (1959).
85 CAL. EVIDENCE CoD. § 1151, comment: "Section 1151 does not prevent the use
of evidence of subsequent remedial conduct for the purpose of impeachment in appro-
priate cases. This is in accord with Pierce v. J. C. Penney Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 3, 334
P.2d 117 (1959)."
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Code is interpreted without careful judicial delineation, however, the policy of
exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial conduct may be further undermined.
Section 785 of the Code allows any party to impeach the credibility of a wit-
ness, including the party calling him.a6 This section changes prior law in Cali-
forma which limited impeachment of one's own witness to cases where the Iatter's
testimony surprised and damaged the party calling him. 7 Applied to the case of
subsequent repairs, this section may produce startling results. As previously stated
an expert witness can be impeached with evidence of subsequent remedial pre-
cautions without the necessity of showing that he participated in any way in such
repaimrs. This section, literally construed, will permit a plaintiff to call his own
expert witness, have him testify that the condition was safe at the time of the
accident, and then impeach his opinion by introducing the evidence of repairs
made after the accident. This, of course, could be done only in cases where the
evidence of repairs is sufficiently prejudicial to over-balance and mitigate the
danger inherent in impeaching one's own witness. In such cases section 785 may
present a second dangerous means by which the exclusionary effect of section
1151 can be avoided. 9
A more subtle problem is encountered in the code section relating to the ad-
missibility of prior mconsistent statements. 40 Before the Code such statements
were admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment, and juries were so in-
structed.41 The Code, however, has changed the law dramatically on ths subject.
Prior mconsistent statements are now admitted as substantive evidence and as
such qualify as a new exception to the hearsay rule.42 It is noteworthy that evi-
dence of subsequent precautions is most frequently found in a verbal context-
statements about the prior condition or orders to take steps to remedy the earlier
condition.
Also significant is the legal resemblance between the two forms of impeach-
ment. In the case of prior mconsistent statements, the testimony of the witness
at the trial is impeached by an earlier statement which demonstrates that he did
not always believe to be true the fact to which he testifies or the opunon which
he currently holds. Similarly, in the case of impeachment by evidence of subse-
quent repairs, it is the witness' earlier action or order to make repairs which
evinces a belief contrary to the opinion of safety to which he testifies at the trial.
In light of these similarities an industrious attorney might well be able to per-
suade a judge that the conversation of a defendant that resulted in repairs being
made constituted prior mconsistent statements winch could be used as such to
impeach the latter's testimony at trial. However, inasmuch as pre-code law re-
quired the court to give limiting instructions both in cases of impeachment by
prior mconsistent statements and cases of impeachment by subsequent repairs, 43
no advantage would have been gained by such an argument.
86 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 785.
87 People v. Le Beau, 39 Cal. 2d 146, 245 P.2d 302 (1952).
S8 Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957).
39 While it seems inconceivable that a judge would allow such an obvious maneuver
to jeopardize the clear intent of § 1151, there seems to be at the present time no case
or code section winch specifically prevents such a device.
40 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 770, 1235.
41 Wrr IN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 537.
42 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1235, comment.
43 See notes 27 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
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With the Code's important change respecting the nature of prior inconsistent
statements, 44 however, the similarities between the two forms of npeachment
take on added significance. Now if plaintiff could succeed in qualifying the de-
fendant's order to make repairs as a prior inconsistent statement, it would seem
that this evidence would have to be admitted without even the mmnimal protection
of a limiting instruction.
If the only statement plaintiff introduced was defendant's order to make re-
pairs, it is clear that it could not qualify as a prior inconsistent statement within
the meaning of the hearsay exception. For, by definition, to so qualify, a state-
ment must be offered to prove the truth of the matter stated;45 and an order or a
command has neither truth nor falsity, and is offered in our case, not for its truth
but rather for the inference drawn from defendant's act of ordering repairs that
he was not of the opinion that the condition at the time of the accident was safe.
It seems highly unlikely, however, that this problem will be presented in such
a simplified form. It is more probable that any order to make repairs will be the
result of some discussion concerning the condition which has occasioned the ac-
cident. In this latter case, when there is an attempt to admit into evidence the
order to make repairs along with one or more of the collateral statements, thejudge's problem is a more difficult one. Suppose the statements offered as evi-
dence are: "I think we can make these stairs safer by placing adhesive stips on
them. I want you to get the best price you can on that stripping and put it on
the steps as soon as possible." Should the judge allow both comments in evidence
as prior inconsistent statements to impeach defendant's testimony at tial that
the steps were safe at the time of the accident?46 It would seem that the latter
one is merely an order and therefore would not qualify as a prior inconsistent
statement within the meaning of the hearsay exception.4 7 However, if the judge
is unwilling to admit the order as a prior inconsistent statement, must he then
dissect the two, admitting the former as substantive evidence and limiting the
latter by an instruction that the jury consider it only as bearing upon the veracity
of the defendant's opinion?48 Furthermore, must not the jury be highly sophis-
ticated to grasp this differentiation?
44 See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
4 5 CAL. EVMENCE CODE § 1200 provides: "'Hearsay evidence' is evidence of a
statement, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."
46 The first of the two sentences would apparently constitute a prior inconsistent
statement if offered to impeach testimony that the premises were absolutely safe at the
time of the accident.
47 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
48A careful reading of §§ 1151 and 1235 evinces another argument against the
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements regarding subsequent repairs as substantive
evidence. Section 1235 states that prior inconsistent statements are not rendered in-
admissibMe by the hearsay rule. There is nothing m this section that suggests that as
substantive evidence they are free from the restrictions of other code sections. It could
be argued that even as prior inconsistent statements they concern subsequent repairs,
and that § 1151 requires a limiting instruction when admitted for the purposes of im-
peachment. However, the plaintiffs answer in such a case might well be that the fact
that the evidence concerns subsequent repairs is only collateral to its major function as
an inconsistent statement, and should not, as such, necessitate any limitation.
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Conclusion
However difficult each of the preceding problems may seem, their resolution
will be far more easily realized once the judiciary has given a definitive answer
to the basic question upon which all these others are predicated-should evidence
of remedial conduct be admitted for the purpose of impeaching a witness whom
the plaintiff himself has called?
If the major question is to be answered in the negative, there are at least two
means by wbich such a decision could be unplemented. The most effective way
to eliminate the dangers inherent in the impeachment exception would be to dis-
allow the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial conduct to impeach a
witness called by the plaintiff. Such a limitation would prevent the plaintiff from
planning the subterfuge suggested in the earlier part of the note.49 Moreover, the
plaintiff could not impeach Ins own expert witness under Section 785.50 This
limitation, though, would still allow impeachment in cases where justified by the
voluntary testimony of defendant or defendant's witness.
To bring about such a change in the present law the court would be required
to overrule the decision of Daggett v. Atchinson, T. & S.F Ry.51 which held
that evidence of repairs could be used for the purposes of impeaching an adverse
witness called by the plaintiff. With respect to limiting section 785, any such
ruling must come as a part of the future evolution of the new code provision.
While it is this writer's opinion that the preceding suggestion provides the
most effective solution to the foregoing problems, the code itself contains another
supplementary protection against future liberalization of such impeachment. Sec-
tion 352 grants the trial judge the discretion of refusing evidence where its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will create substantial danger of undue prejudice. 2 It can be persuasively argued
that evidence of remedial conduct offered to impeach a witness under the cir-
cumstances enumerated above5 3 would qualify for exclusion under this section.
However, since section 352 is a general provision, it offers the judge no guidelines
to the solution of the specific questions raised in this note. Consequently, the
protection offered by section 352, contingent as it is upon the knowledge and
sophistication of the trial judge, would seem effective only to complement a
stronger court ruling against admissibility of evidence of repairs.
It is beyond the scope of this note to evaluate the basic policy arguments
which originally precipitated the adoption of the exclusionary rule codified in
section 1151. For the present discussion, however, it should suffice to note that
the California legislature found such arguments persuasive when they chose to
incorporate this section into the Code. In light of this clear manifestation of legis-
lative intent, any clever legal subterfuge which circumvents the prohibition of
section 1151 and undermines the purpose for which it was adopted, would seem
subject to critical judicial scrutiny. It is hoped that the courts will recognize that
the rule embodied in section 1151 and the impeachment exception as presently
49 See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.50 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
5148 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957).
52 CAL. EVIENCE Coie- § 352.
53 See notes 22-26, 38 supra and accompanying text.
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